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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UT.A.H PIPE LINE CO:JIP.A.NY, a
corporation~

Petitioner,
-vs.PUBLIC S-ER\"ICE COThi11ISSION
OF l~T_J._\H, IL~ S. BENNETT,
W. R. :JicENTIRE and STEWART
::JI. HANSON, Commissioners of the
Public Service Commission of Utah,
and l~TAH NATURAL GAS COMpANY, a corporation,
Respondents.

Case No:
7695

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
The respondents, Public Service Commission of
Utah, Hal S. Bennett, W. R. McEntire, Stewart M. Hanson, Commissioners of the Public Service Commission
of Utah and the respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company
have filed separate briefs herein making the same contentions and substantially citing the same cases. As a
consequence petitioner will reply to those briefs as
though but one brief had been filed by the respondents.
The initial contention of respondents is to the effect
that petitioner does not have a justiciable interest in
the controversy in this action or to state the contention
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another way, that petitioner is not an aggrieved party.
We will not burden the court with a further brief on this
point because the same matter has heretofore been before
the court in this case and disposed of adversely to the
respondents. In May, 1951 the McGuire Company and
the Public Service Commission of Utah each filed motions to dismiss this action claiming, as they now claim,
that petitioner does not have a justiciable interest in the
controversy. Extensive briefs were prepared and filed
by the parties and the matter fully argued to the court
(Justices Lattimer, Wade and Crockett sitting) on June
4, 1951. On July 5, 1951 this court denied the motions
to dismiss. This case is therefore now before the court
on the merits. Those portions of respondents' printed
briefs devoted to the point that petitioner has no justiciable interest in the controversy are copied from the
typewritten briefs filed by respondents in support of
their motions to dismiss and, with the exception of one
case, are a restatement of the same arguments and the
same cases presented to the court on June 4, 1951. In
answer to the briefs filed by respondents in support of
their motions to dismiss the petitioner filed with this
court on June 4, 1951 its brief wherein it presented its
arguments and cases in opposition to the motions to dismiss. Petitioner made two points:
POINT ONE-Title 76 Utah Code Annotated,
1943 expressly gives petitioner, as an aggrieved
party, a right of review in this Court.
POINT TWO-Independent of the right of review
provided by the Utah statute, petitioner has such
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special interest in the subjeet 1natter of the action
as to "Tarrant reYie"T by this Court.
\Ve assn1ne the court \Yill have no desire to reexamine a matter heretofore fully briefed and argued
before the court and upon \Yhich it has made a final order.
Ho,vever for the conyenience of any men1ber of the court
\Yho desires to reexan1ine the matter we have printed
as an appendix to this reply brief the brief filed with the
court on respondents' motions to dismiss. In that brief
all of the cases no'v relied upon by respondents, except
one, were reviewed by petitioner. The one case not previously cited by respondents is Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Cornpany v. Federal Power Commission, et al (CCA 5th,
1940) 113 Fed. 2d 281. In that case the Louisiana Nevada
Transit Company had sought and procured a certificate
of convenience and necessity to construct a pipe line into
an area served by Arkansas Louisiana for the primary
purpose of serving industrial consumers. Arkansas
Louisiana appealed mainly upon two grounds: (1) That
the finding of the Commission that the public convenience and necessity would be served was not supported
by substantial evidence, and (2) that the conditions attached to Louisiana Nevada's certificate relating to rates
and other matters rendered the certificate void because
the Commission did not have statutory power to control
and regulate direct sales to industrial consumers for their
own use as opposed to sale of gas for resale.
The Court first held, at page 283, that the evidence
was sufficient to support the order granting the certificate. It then proceeded to overrule the other contentions
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of the appellant and in so doing made the statement
quoted by respondent Utah Natural Gas Company (at
page 41) to the effect that the order granting the certificate was what aggrieved appellant and since the Court
had upheld that order, the appellant could not then claim
that the conditions invalidated it. In order to make this
holding the Court had, of course, allowed the appellant
to appeal as an aggrieved party to the order, heard its
contention that the order was unsupported by the evidence and then found against such contention.
This interpretation of the case is well supported
by the opinion of the same Court and the same Judge
some eight years later in the case of Cia M exicana de
Gas v. Federal Power Commission (CCA 5th, 1948) 167
Fed. 2d 804, discussed in petitioner's brief on respondents' motions to dismiss the writ of certiorari.
In short, respondents have had their day in court
on the question as to: whether petitioner is an aggrieved
party and it has not been the practice of this court to try
the same issue twice.
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS OF RESPONDENTS

In a consideration of reserves for a projected natural
gas pipeline the reserves might be classified into three
categories-possible, probable and proven. If a well
were drilled on any known structure geologists would
agree that natural gas might possibly be discovered. If
a well were drilled on a structure having completed gas
wells then it might be said that there was a probable reserve. If a structure had producing wells in a pattern so
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complete· that the sands 'Yere 'Yell kno,vn, that the lilnits
of the structure were well defined, then· it n1ight be said
there .was a proven reserve. Geologists would use more
refined definitions but to a layman the foregoing is a
fair statement of possible, probable and proven reserves.
The mere existence of a structure is not enough. Like
other states there are scores of structures in Utah some
small and some extensive. With this in mind the respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company called as its first expert,
:Jir. Willson, a petroleum geologist who worked almost
exclusively for Byrd-Frost, Inc. (R. 55). Mr. Willson
identified numerous _structures and then guessed as to
their potential gas production. As a corroberating witness, Utah Natural called Mr. Gordon, a full-time employee of Byrd.:Frost, Inc. (R. 744). These were the
~IcGuire Company's principal witnesses on reserves.
While there was considerable speculation and guessing
as to the gas that might be
developed if numerous struc,
tures were drilled, the only proven reserve back of the
projected pipeline of the McGuire Company was the
reserve at Boundary Butte. There three wells had been
drilled to the gas zone, the English No. 1 and the Navajo
Nos. 1 and 2. The first two wells were completed and
the last was abandoned as a dry hole. It developed at
the hearing that an independent consulting firm from Ft.
Worth, Texas (Cummins, Berger and Pishny) had made
a thorough study of the reserves at Boundary Butte.
This report was not offered by the McGuire Company
until petitioner had made repeated· demands for its production and when it became apparent that the Commis-

.
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s1on might conclude that the McGuire Company was
suppressing evidence, that portion of the report relating
to Boundary Butte was finally produced. The report
(page 20) with a correcting telegram (R. 1103) was received as Exhibit 66 and attributed to Boundary Butte
a total proven recoverable reserve available to the ByrdFrost, Inc.-English interests and committed to the McGuire Company of 13 billion 661 million cubic feet. This
reserve would be adequate to supply the projected pipeline of the McGuire Company for 136 days. That is to
say, a pipeline having a deliverability of 100 million
cubic feet a day could be supplied for 136 days from areserve of 13 billion 661 million cubic feet provided no
allowance was made for losses in transmission and delivery. Yet this is the reserve upon which the McGuire
Company would have the public of the Salt Lake area
rely.
As to the other structures, witness Willson testified
that no gas had been produced from greater Monticello
and no well had been completed as a gas producer but
still Mr. Willson said this area was a probable source
of supply (R. 86). Mr. Willson made the same speculations relative to the Last Chance structure.
In the final analysis the McGuire Company must
rest its case upon the reserve available at Boundary
Butte. The basic supply then for a pipeline to cost $32
million is a supply adequate for 136 days. The effect of
the order is to invite the public to spend hundreds of
thousands of dollars on gas-burning equipment to be
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supplied from a pipeline that eould not furnish sufficient
gas for one seYere "~inter.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS THAT THE
COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATE

(a) In an attempt to support its thesis that the
Commission may impose \Yhatever conditions it sees fit
in the issuance of a certificate, the Commission cites
Subsection 3 of Section 76-4-24, U.C.A., 1943. The section relied upon deals \vith the situation wherein a public
utility must secure not only a certificate of convenience
and necessity, but must also secure a franchise from a
political subdivision of the State of Utah. It is the Commission's contention that this section authorizes the
imposition of any manner or description of condition,
even to the extent of condoning the proof and determination of a fundamental prerequisite to the granting of a
certificate after the close of the hearing. It is submitted,
however, that, to the contrary, the portion of the Statute
quoted by the Commission for at least two reasons condemns, rather than supports, this view.
In the first portion of the section referred to, the
Legislature has set out in a general way the procedure
whereby certificates may be issued. It has stated in
subsection (1) that no construction shall be commenced
without first obtaining from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and
necessity does or will require such construction. Subsection 3 states that the Commission shall have the power
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after a hearing, to issue the certificate either in whole

or in part and attach thereto conditions as in its judgment
public convenience and necessity may require. Immediately following this provision in subsection 3, the Legislature has provided for a situation wherein it foresaw
that public utilities might run into difficulty. Obviously,
the Legislature had in mind an instance where a public
utility desired to construct facilities within the corporate
lirnits of a municipality and for which construction and
operation the utility would need a franchise from the
municipality. The public utility, being regulated by the
statute under question, would also need a certificate of
convenience and necessity. To avoid the dilemma the
public utility would find itself in if it could not get the
franchise without the certificate or could not get the
certificate without the franchise, the Legislature specifically provided that in such a situation the public utility
could come to the Public Service Commission, set forth
its intentions and show that it intended to and would attempt to secure the necessary franchise. The statute
then provides that if the utility conforms with this procedure, the Commission may .then issue a preliminary
order to the effect that when the utility gets the franchise,
then the Commission will issue the desired certificate
after the utility has acquired the franchise. Finally, the
statute provides that, when the utility presents the franchise in question, the Commission may then issue the
certificate.
It will be noted that this is the only instance wherein the Legislature has seen fit to provide for such a proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cedure. In this one instance the Commission can issue a
preliminary order stating that it "'"ill issue a subsequent
certificate to take care of a situation where a public
utility cannot, practically speaking, con1ply with the basic
prerequisites necessary to the issuance of a certificate
of convenience and necessity. By setting up such a pro . .
cedure the Legislature has implied that in all other
instances the statute must be strictly complied with.
A general and 'veil settled rule of statutory construction strengthens this view. As stated in 50 Am. Jur.,
Statutes, Section 244, at page 238:
"It is a general principal of interpretation
that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; 'expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.' The rule applies even though there are
no negative words excluding the things not mentioned. Thus, a statute that directs a thing to be
done in a particular manner or by certain persons
or entities, ordinarily implies that it shall not be
done in any other manner, or by other persons or
entities."
As further stated in the same work, 50 Am. J ur.,
utes, Section 434, at page 455:

Stat~

"The specification by the Legislature of exceptions to the operation of a general statute,
does not necessarily operate to preclude the court
from applying other exceptions. However, where
express exceptions are made, the legal presumption is that the Legislature did not intend to save
other cases from the operation of the statute. In
such case, the inference is a strong one that no
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other exceptions were intended, and the rule generally applied is that an exception in the statute
amounts to an affirmation of the application of its
provisions to all other ca.ses not excepted, and excludes all other exceptions or the enlargement of
exceptions made. Under this principle, where a
general rule has been established by statute, with
exceptions, the courts will not curtail the former
nor add to the latter by implication. In this respect
it has been declared that the courts will not enter
into the legislative field and add to exceptions
prescribed by statute."
If the Legislature had intended that the Commission
could dispense with essential prerequisites by the attachment of conditions to the certificate such as those attached in the case before this Court, it certainly could
have so provided. The fact that the Legislature provided
a procedure as above discussed for one instance and one
instance only would seem to indicate that it did not wish
to deviate from the standard procedure in any other
instance.
Furthermore, the portion of the statute quoted by
the Commission is illuminating for another reason. It
will be noted that the Legislature has given the c·ommission power to attach conditions to certificates in the
sentence immediately preceding the questioned clause.
They then proceeded to provide for a system of preliminary orders followed by the issuance of a certificate
in the franchise situation. This clearly indicates that they
had no idea that the grant of the power to the Commission to attach conditions to a certificate in any way
gave the Commission power to provide, by the use of
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such conditions, for the proving of essential prerequisites
at a later date.
For these reasons, and in light of the clear wording
of the statute in general as discussed by petitioner in its
first brief under Point C, pages 75 to 84, it is submitted
that the Commission's interpretation is untenable.
The cases discussed by the Commission at pages
1-! and 15 of its brief in no way support the Commission's
contention in connection with which they are cited. The
primary concern of the Arkansas Commission in the case
of Re Southwestern Gas & Electric Company (1949)
82 PlTR (NS) 52, was not that the government contract
had not been legally finalized. Instead, it was that the
company might construct the facilities to take the hydroelectric power into its system and include such new facilities in its present rate base before it actually began to
take the electricity into its system. The Commission expressly negated any such eventuality by attaching to its
certificate a condition that the company could not include
the new facilities in the computation of its rates. This
was the only condition attached to the certificate.
In the Tennessee Gas Transmission Company case,
76 PUR (NS-) 422, cited at page 14 of the Commission's
brief, which was a case involving an application for a
certificate of convenience and necessity allowing the
construction of additional gas pipeline facilities, the c·ommission, upon the final hearing, was disturbed by the fact
that the applicant had not attempted to secure competitive bidding from financial-houses for the purchase of its
bonds to be issued in financing the new facilities. The
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Co1nmission noted in its opinion that the financial houses
proposed for such financing were closely allied to and
in fact were large stockholders of the applicant. The
Commission felt upon the evidence presented that a more
favorable return to the applicant upon its bonds might be
procured by offering the bonds to several financial
houses on a competitive bidding ba~is. They therefore
indicated that the certificate should be issued but imposed
a condition requiring such competitive bidding. In the
Panhandle case, cited by the Commission at page 15 of its
brief, the Commission had attached to the certificate
issued to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company the
condition that Michigan-Wisconsin should obtain approval of its proposed plan of financing by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The apparent reason for
such condition was that.the parent company of MichiganWisconsin was a regulated holding company and therefore no definite commitment for financing was possible
without the approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It will be noted that the above cases are
all instances where conditions were attached to enable
the commissions involved to more efficiently carry out
their regulatory duties under the various statutes involved. Indeed, the cases are closely comparable to those
cases cited by the petitioner in its brief under Point C,
pages 77 and 78, wherein it is pointed out that undoubtedly such clauses in statutes of the type here involved
were intended to assist in regulation of utilities rather
than to allow commissions to dispense with the proof of
fundamental prerequisites at the hearing called for the
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very purpose of deter1nining such Ina tters. It is further
submitted that this view adequately explains the questions raised by lTtah Natural Gas Company in its brief,
pages 19 through :21, and the apparent inability of counsel there to distinguish between conditions of a mere
regulatory nature as opposed to the type of condition
complained of in this appeal.
Utah Natural Gas Company in its brief, pages 25
through 31, has raised questions concerning authorities
cited by petitioner in its brief which it is felt should be
briefly discussed at this point. As to the case of Re
.Achtenburg, complained of by Utah Natural Gas Company at page 27 of its brief, it should be here pointed
out that petitioner reproduced a quotation from that
case on pages 27 and 28 of its brief in order to support
the fundamental proposition that where a particular
applicant is seeking a certificate: of public convenience
and necessity to perform a particular service, such an
applicant must show, in order to establish the public convenience and necessity for a particular service, that he
can furnish the service concerning which he is seeking
a certificate. The Missouri Commission in that case had
made a very clear statement of such view and it was
reproduced in the brief, not as a binding precedent
squarely in point upon the facts, but as a clear and concise statement of the interpretation being discussed.
The case was again quoted from on page 57 of petitioner's
brief, along with other authorities there being presented,
to point out how the Missouri Commission had considered, in a case before it, the necessity of an appliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cant's presenting a reasonably definite plan of financing
the facilities for which a certificate was being sought.
The Grand Rapids Gas Company case is complained
of by Utah Natural Gas Company at pages 27 to 29 of
its brief. Petitioner had quoted from the Grand Rapids
case at pages 30 and 31 of its brief to point out how the
Michigan Commission had required that in a particular
case wherein a utility sought a certificate to build a
natural gas pipe line, the utility must establish that it
had available a sufficient quantity of natural gas to serve
the locality it sought to serve for a reasonable length of
time. This requirement was found to exist even though
the Michigan statute was of a general nature similar to
the Utah statute and did not list any such requirement
in the section dealing with hearings to grant certificates
of convenience and necessity. Counsel for Utah Natural
Gas Company has apparently misread the opinion in
that case and ·has omitted certain pertinent facts which
should here be pointed out. The evidence before the
Commission in that case revealed that while the reserves
in the fields from which the applicant proposed to take
gas were insufficient to supply the city of Grand Rapids
with one hundred per cent natural gas for a period of
more than four years, it was evident that the applicant
could, by mixing natural gas with artificial gas, serve the
city for a period of from eight to ten years. The applicant was already in the business of serving the city with
manufactured gas and it is apparent from the Commission's discussion of the evidence that, should the reserves
of natural gas fail or prove insufficient, this artificial gas
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
could again be relied upon to furnish the connnunity
"~ith gas service. It appears that the service of the mixed
gas would be greatly beneficial to the consumers of
Grand Rapids in that there "\Yould be a considerable saving in rates and a considerable increase in the consumption of gas. The Commission """as obviously satisfied
that the line "\Yould pay out in the conservatively estimated minimum life of eight years. The second quotation on page 2S of the Utah Natural Gas Company brief
is not a quotation from the opinion of the Commission
but is a quotation from the dissenting opinion of one of
the Commissioners, "\Yhose opinion begins at 13 PUR
(NS) page 458. It will be noted from a study of the Commission's opinion that the order granting the certificate
allowed delivery of gas only on a 50% natural and 50%
manufactured gas basis.
At page 29 of Utah Natural Gas Company's brief,
counsel attacks the case of Incorporators of Service Gas
Company v. Public Service Commission of Pe11/Jtsylvania on the apparent assumption that petitioner has relied upon that case in its brief. It will be noted, however, that the Incorporators case was included (at page
35 of petitioner's brief) in a quotation taken from the
case of Re Kansas Pipe Line &!; Gas Company) 30 PUR
(NS) 321.
In attacking the Re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co1npany case at pages 30 and 31 (which was quoted from at
pages 34 and 35 of petitioner's brief) counsel for Utah
Natural Gas Company points to the fact that the Federal
Power Commission, because of the failure of the appliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cant to present firm contracts for the purchase of gas
fro1n the reserves relied upon, did not issue a certificate
in that case but retained jurisdiction requiring additional
showing. This, of course, was pointed out on page 35 of
petitioner's brief and it would appear that in holding
the matter in abeyance until a further showing was made,
rather than issuing a certificate with a condition requiring subsequent proof, the Commission followed the procedure which petitioner throughout this appeal has urged
1s a proper one.
Counsel for the Utah Natural Gas Company, at
pages 23 to 25, has relied heavily upon the Decisions
of this Court in the two cases styled Los Angeles and
Salt Lake Railroad Company v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, et al, 15 P. 2d 358 and 17 P. 2d 287. The two
cases, while similar as to parties and facts, actually involve two separate petitions of the railroad company to
change two separate railroad stations from an agency
to a non agency status. The primary question in both
cases was whether or not, under what is now Section
76-3-1, U.C.A. 1943, the change in status requested by
the railroad could be granted and still comply with such
section. The section in question requires that, "Every
public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such
service instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will
promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of
its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in
all respects, adequate, efficient, just and reasonable."
In both cases the Commission denied the request of the
railroad.
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The appeals to this Court in the Los Angeles cases
w·ere brought tmder the same section of the statutes as
this appeal was brought, Section 76-6-16, U.C.A. 1943.
In both cases the primary question before the Court was
"~hether or not there 'vas substantial evidence to support
the findings and order of the Commission in denying the
railroad's request. It is interesting to note that in the
first case (involving the St. John Station) this Court held
that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding, while in the second case (involving
the Faust Station) this Court held that the Commission's
findings and order were not suppo.rted by substantial
evidence.
In the first case this Court, in attempting to determine "-chat its duties and powers were on appeal, cites
and discusses various New Mexico cases, as can be noted
from the quotation respondent Utah Natural Gas Company presents on page 24 of its brief. As this Court
pointed out in distinguishing the New Mexico cases, the
New Mexico court's power of review was far more extensive than that of this Court. However, this Court observed that the New Mexico Court applied, as a test of
the reasonableness of the Commission's order in requiring a railroad agent at a point where not needed for
public safety, that both the public convenience to be
served and the increased cost of the service to the company are to be considered. This Court then went on to
state, at 15 P. 2d 361, that these factors which the S·upreme c·ourt of New Mexico considered in testing the
reasonableness are exactly .the same factors which the
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Utah Con1mission should consider in determining the
question as to whether the agency should be continued.
It further said that this Court, in reviewing the decision
of the Utah Commission, does not directly measure, consider or determine these two factors and come to an independent decision, but must determine whether or not
the Commission has considered these two factors and
whether or not there is substantial evidence to support
the Commission's finding.
On page 25 of Utah Natural Gas Company's brief,
counsel presents a short quotation from the second case
concerning out of state precedents. This quotation is a
sentence from the middle of the paragraph on page 15,
P. 2d 369, and, read in context, does not appear to convey the meaning for which counsel presents it. Furthermore, petitioner has never cited out of state cases which
it has urged as binding precedents upon the Utah Commission. It has referred to out of state cases for the purpose of illustrating and convincing beyond doubt that
the Utah Commission has not complied with its statutory and constitutional obligations.
Petitioner has no quarrel with the discussions by this
Court in the Los Angeles cases concerning its scope of
review, so long as those discussions are read in the light
of the cases involved and the results reached in each
case. It will be noted that this Court reached opposite
results in the Los Angeles cases in determining the question of whether or not the Commission had before it substantial evidence to support the respective orders issued
in those cases. It is also interesting to note that respond-
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ent l;tah Natural Gas Con1pany has attempted to take
quotations from both cases in support of its argument.
The general language of the rules and guides under which
this Court must revie"T appeals fro1n the Commission is
easily quoted in support of either side in a case of this
nature. The difficulty con1es, hovvever, in applying the
rules to the fact situation before the Court in a given
case. It is subn1itted that Utah Natural Gas Company
has failed, by quoting generalities and excerpts out of
context from the above opinions, to detract from the
contentions raised by this petitioner in its brief under
Points A, B and C.
(b) An examination of the· so-called conditional
certificate issued to the ~fcGuire Company will show that
it is conditional in name only. That is to say, a certificate
which places in the hands of the applicant the very power
to determine whether or not it has complied with a
condition is not a conditional certificate but is an absolute certificate. The Commission's order requiring the
McGuire Company to show within the one~year period
adequate proven reserves and permitting such showing
to be made by the filing of a certificate prepared by a
geologist selected by the McGuire Company gives to the
McGuire Company the determination of whether it has
met the condition. It is true the order says that the qualifications of the geologist must be satisfactory to the
Commission, but what member of the c·ommission has
the training and ability to determine the geologist's qualifications~ This is not a situation where the Commission
would be acting in a quasi-judicial capacity at a hearing
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and have the benefit of the cross examination of the
geologist by adverse parties as his qualifications. The
Commission will be required to determine the geologist's
qualifications based upon the representations of the McGuire Company and not otherwise. The certificate of the
geologist is merely an opinion and it will be a simple
n1atter for the McGuire Company to obtain such certificate. Such an order places in the hands of the McGuire
Company the power to meet the condition notwithstanding the true facts.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS THAT THE
ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DOES
NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF ITS
AUTHORITY

The Commission in its brief under the above point
contends in effect that the order granting the certificate
of convenience and necessity does not in fact mean what
it says. It contends that upon the expiration of a oneyear period a hearing will be held to determine whether
the supply of gas is adequate and that all interested
parties will be given notice and will be given an opportunity to appear.
If this was actually the intention of the Commission
when it issued the order in question, it certainly is not
manifest by the definite wording of the order itself. The
order granting the certificate of convenience and necessity (R. 1173) unequivocally grants the certificate and
then attaches the condition, among others, that within
one year from the date of the order, Utah Natural Gas
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Con1pany shall file \Yi th the Con1n1ission the certificate of
an independent geologist of recognized professional
standing acceptable to the Commission that there are
proven gas reserves committed to Utah Natural Gas
Company adequate to justify the construction of the line
and facilities, and further states that if such is not done
then the certificate shall be null and void.
This is the final order of the Commission as to the
merits of the proceeding complained of below. Petitioner
filed its motion for rehearing as prescribed by the statute
and this was overruled. To all intents and purposes,
petitioner had exhausted its possible resources of relief
before the Commission.
In accordance with the specific terms of the statute
(Section 76-6-16 U.C.A. 1943) petitioner then took the
only practical step open to it to correct what it deemed
to be gross errors committed by the Commission in the
hearing held before it. According to the statute, it had to,
within thirty days after the decision on its motion for
rehearing, apply to this Court for certiorari or waive its
right of appeal from the order entered. In determining
what its rights were under the order, the petitioner of
necessity had to accept the order as written. It is difficult to conceive an order the language of which points
to a more singular construction. Neither this petitioner,
nor anyone else, can afford to rely upon the promises
and overtures of the Commission's counsel. The purported responsibility and liability of counsel are of
small comfort, nor can they redress the grevious wrongs
perpetrated upon petitioner by the order in question.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
It must not be overlooked that petitioner is here
appealing from the order entered on March 12, 1951,
and from that order only. The undisclosed intention of
the Commission at that time, as .now in retrospect disctissed by the Commission's counsel, and the possibility of
what the Commission may do one year from that date
are not involved in this appeal.
In an attempt to excuse the contents of the order
granting the certificate counsel for the Commission takes
full responsibility "for the inaptness of the language" and
says:
"It is contended by the Petitioner that the
Public Service Commission of Utah in the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued on
l\1.:arch 12, 1951 delegated to a geologist the po,ver
of the Commission to make a finding as to the
adequacy of the gas. supply of Utah Natural Gas
Company. This, the Commission did not intend
to do and does not believe that it did do.
"In order to determine whether or not there
is an adequate supply of gas it is, of course, necessary for the Commission to lean very heavily
upon the testimony of expert witnesses on this
subject. The Commission has listened to experts
·produced by Utah Natural Gas Company, by Utah
Pipe Line Company and other interested parties
and reserves the right to make its own investigation to aid it to determine this fact. If the language of the c·ommission order is subject to the interpretation placed thereupon by Petitioner, it
certainly carries a meaning not intended by the
Commission and for the inaptness of the: language,
if such exists, counsel takes full responsibility.
Upon the expiration of the one year period
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granted in the certificate in \Yhieh the applicant,
Utah Natural Gas Company, 1uay present evidence
that it has an adequate supply of gas and adequate financing available it is the intention of the
Public Service Com1nission of Utah to again set
the matter do,vn for hearing. All interested parties \Yill be given notice and will be given an
opportunity to appear. The burden of proof will
be upon the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, to prove to the satisfaction of the Commission that an adequate supply of gas is available.
This proof, of course, must come in the form of
testimony by con1petent witnesses. The petitioner
in this case, as well as all other protestants, will
be given an opportunity to controvert this evidence if they feel that it is not reliable. However,
the Commission felt that before it should proceed
''ith any such hearing the applicant, Utah Natural
Gas Company, should first furnish the Commission with documentary evidence which would establish prima facie that the requirements of the
certificate had been met. It was not and is not the
intention of the Commission to delegate any of its
powers. When the necessary evidence is in as to
whether or not the conditions of the certificate
have been met, the Commission will then consider
this additional evidence and on the basis of that
evidence will reach its own findings as to whether
or not Utah Natural Gas Company has complied
with the orders of the c·ommission and is entitled
to have its certificate made unconditional." (Pages
16 and 17, Commission's brief.)
We question counsel's authority to bind the Public
Service Commission by statements contained in the Commission's brief interpreting the order. But counsel does
not stop there. Counsel now proposes to enlarge upon
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the provisions of the order. The order is clear that if
before one year has elapsed the certificate of the geologist and the commitment of the financial institution
have not been filed with the Commission then automatically the certificate to the McGuire 0 ompany will expire.
Counsel now says that such is not to be the case: that
even after the year has gone by
"Utah Natural Gas Company may then present evidence that it has an adequate supply of
gas and adequate financing available."
and the Public Service Commission will give Utah
Natural a hearing. Nowhere in the order is there any
provision for a further hearing or for an extension of
time after the year for the McGuire Company to make
proof. Obviously this statement of counsel for the Commission is a recognition of the invalidity of the present
order and an attempt to have the order supported by the
court by representing that the c·ommission will have another hearing. But n.owhere does counsel say that in that
hearing Utah Pipe Line. Company is to have any right
to present its proposed project or to show the extent of
its proven reserves.· The way to give Utah Pipe Line
Company a hearing is for this court to annul the present
order. Such action by the court will undoubtedly result
in the Commission doing what it should have done in the
first instance,-.hear all applicants, Utah Natural Gas
Company, Utah Pipe Line Company, and then determine
which of the applicants can best serve the public needs.
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' MISCELLANEOUS
ARGUl\fENTS

' """e 'viii briefly ans""er son1e of the miscellaneous
statements and argun1ents made by the respondents as
follows:
1. The ~IcGuire Company suggests that the pipe
line must be kept in the hands of "friendly interests."
Friendly to w·hom? Friendly to Mr. McGuire and his
associates. Unfriendly to the public interest in that the
people of this state must continue to wait for an adequate supply of natural gas while the McGuire Company
maneuvers and hunts for a supply. Considerable space
in the briefs is devoted to the great benefits that the ByrdFrost, Inc. - English interests were going to give to
the State of Utah. ~Ir. Byrd frankly said that he was
drilling for oil (T. 730) and if, as Mr. Senior, attorney
for the Coal Operators, said in his argument to the Commission, the wildcat driller could find the "second prize,"
i.e., gas, so much the better.
This court will take judicial notice of the extensive
drilling being carried on now in practically all the counties of Utah. The Byrd-Frost, Inc.-English interests,
like Utah Southern Oil Company, Carter Oil Company,
Equity Oil Company, California Company, Americol
Petroleum Inc., Standard Oil Company of California,
Gulf Oil Corporation, Skelley Oil Company, Shell Oil
Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, Stanolind, MidContinental, Vernal Oil and Gas Company, Sun Oil Company, J ohnson-Bunn Watson Oil Company and many
others are engaged in drilling Utah structures primarily
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for the purpose of discovering oil. There is no more
reason for the Public Service Commission of Utah favoring the Byrd-Frost, Inc.-English interests with a certificate to their associate Mr. McGuire, than there is to
extend a blanket certificate to every concern engaged in
drilling Utah structures. Counsel argues that Byrd-Frost
does not make a practice of selling corporate stock. Anyone familiar with the oil and gas business knows that the
scheme is not the sale of corporate stock but consists of
transactions in royalties, leases and options. The suggestion that Byrd-Frost has committed itself to spend
enormous amounts in drilling in Utah raises the question,_ to whom was the legal commitment made~ Who
could sue Byrd-Frost if it defaults~ Certainly not Mr.
McGuire because there is no contract in evidence of any
commitment to him or to his company or to any other
person, for the drilling of a single well.
2. For some reason best known to the McGuire
Company it points out that petitioner is the only party
to appeal from the Commission's order. When one understands the record and the parties participating it is clear
why this is so. Mountain Fuel Supply Company has not
appealed because the effect of the c·ommission's order is
to keep gas from the Salt Lake area and this operates
to the advantage of Mountain F'uel Supply Company.
W. W. Ray, attorney for Mountain Fuel Supply Company, was frank in telling the Commission such would be
the effect of the issuance of a certificate to the McGuire
Company. Mr. Ray said:
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HThe -"--\.pplicants ean1e here "Tith great pron1ise and great undertaking. Now they ask of this
Comnussion an option to tie up everything in
lTtah for a period of one to three years, and in
)Ir. Corn,Yalrs generous offer he \vas to receive
everything fron1 this l~ommission and guarantee
nothing. They are not required to drill a well;
they are not required to secure a single solitary
dollar to get gas to this community. They may sit
supine!~~ by when this hearing is adjourned and
come to this Commission a year from now and say,
"\\~e would like another year's extension, Gentlemen, because the country is in trouble, serious
trouble, and ''e don't want to interfere with its
''ar program. Please _give us an option for another year.'- without consideration, totally without consideration, and upon two threats.
"Our first threat was that if we didn't take
this gas now, 'vhich is non-existent, California
needed it very badly; and the final threat is that
they are going to trade some of the gas, excess
gas down there that California doesn't need over
into this market by a trade between someone that
~Ir. Byrd knows and something else. This is a
trading period. These are oil and gas promoters.
They have a corporation with $1,000, and getting
ready for this case they have spent $79,000 of the
1,000 -which shows they are quite generous in
their hopes and their speculations.
"But they have a corporation of $1,000, and
not a sign of a commitment, and they admit the
impasse we find ourselves in today-'If you don't
get a pipeline, you'll get no gas, and if you get
no gas you'll get no pipeline.'
"Now, where does that leave this Commission~ It leaves it with people asking for nothing
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sive right to come into this market for whatever
period may be invo~ved.
"It would be to the interest, I say to this
Commission frankly, of Mountain Fuel Supply
Co1npany to say 'For Heaven's sake, grant this
application, because it leaves us free. They'll do
nothing-we know they'll do nothing. We'll shut
out everybody else, and we, the Mountain Fuel,
will occupy the market alone.' That's what we
should say if we were not talking in the public
interest here today. That's what would happen."

(R. 1022)
The Utah Coal Operators Association did not appeal
because it, like Ray's client, recognized that the granting
of a certificate to the McGuire Company would only
"foul up" plans to deliver into this area additional natural gas and this would operate to the advantage of the
coal operators. There is no harm to the coal companies
in the granting of a certificate to a concern that has no
fuel to deliver. The intervener, the United Mine Workers, is in the same position as the Utah Coal Operators.
The only other persons actively taking a part in the proceedings before the Commission were the railroads (who
are in the same position as United Mine Workers) and
Mr. Irwin Clawson appearing for some twenty small
industrial and apartment house users. Mr. Clawson
recognized that the granting of the certificate to the McGuire Company would be ineffective so far as supplying
his clients and Mr. Clawson urged the Commission that
before it grant the certificate that it hear the application
of Utah Pipe Line Company saying: "And we urge at
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mission hear the lTtah Pipe Line and n1ake their decision
on the basis of the con1bined evidence.'' (R. 1020) ~rhere
fore it is little 'Yonder that lTtah Pipe Line is the only
party seeking a revie,Y.
3. The respondents represent to this Court that
l . .tah Pipe Line Company came into the case at such a
late date that the Commission had no opportunity to give
it an orderly and adequate hearing. This is pure distortion. The ~IcGuire Company filed its application on
~fay 29, 1950. That application laid in the files inactive
from ~Iay until late November. On November 17, 1950
the application "~as enlarged and amended. Notice of a
hearing "~as published for the first time on November
24, 1950 and notice of the hearing mailed to Mr. Turner,
general counsel for Delhi Oil Corporation, Dallas, Texas.
Mr. Turner was advised that the hearing would begin
December 11, 1950. If due allowance is made for the
transmission of the mails, the general counsel for Delhi
had no notice of an intended hearing until virtually
the last moment. Is it little wonder then that he and Mr.
P. T. Bee, Executive Vice President of Delhi Oil Corporation, did not appear in Salt Lake City until the morning the hearing began~ Now, if there had been any intention on the part of the Commission to grant Utah Pipe
Line a hearing, the Commission had adequate opportunity to do so without delaying or prejudicing the application of the McGuire Company. The direct testimony
of witnesses for McGuire was not completed until December 14, 1950. The cross examination of those witnesses
began January 29, 1951 and was completed a few days

-
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later. At no time did the Commission indicate that it
would hear the Utah Pipe Line application. In fact,
the Commission preemptorily on December 11, 1950 advised Messrs. Turner and Bee they would not be
heard on Utah Pipe Line's project (R. 10-13). The Commission took the McGuire application under advisement
and made its order on March 12, 1951. It would have
been a si1nple matter for the Commission at the close of
the hearing on February 2, 1951 to have then set the application of Utah Pipe Line for hearing. If the Commission found itself unable to agree with the Federal Power
Commission on a time for a joint hearing, the Commission could nevertheless have proceeded independ~ntly
to hear the Utah Pipe Line matter. This would have resulted in no inconvenience to the parties or to their counsel or to the Commission. It is a common practice, as the
Commission well knows, for joint hearings to be held
between state commissions and the Federal Power Commission. The Public Service Commission of Utah has
held many such hearings with the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
_4. Counsel says that petitioner might have filed in
this Court an application for a writ of mandamus directed to the Commission to compel it to hear the application of Utah Pipe Line. If the duty of the Commission
to determine in the public interest which of two applicants could best serve the public with natural gas required the commission to hear both applications before
granting any certificate, then the application of Utah
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Pipe Line beca1ne a part of the :JleGuire en~P and should
haYe been heard at the sa1ne tin1e or in sequence 'vith that
case. But aside fro1n this, let us assume that '"e n1ight
have obtained a "~rit of n1andan1us fro1n this Court in
an independent proceeding, any such action \vould not
haYe been in conformity "~ith the rules \vhieh require that
two la\v suits not be filed \vhere one n1ay determine the
controYersy.
CONCLlTSION
The bringing of oil from Rangely, Colorado by pipeline to North Salt Lake has built two oil refineries here
and expanded another. The pipeline \Vhich carries oil
from Wyoming to the refinery of Utah Oil Refining Company has resulted in a large expansion of that refinery.
In fact, the four refineries in the vicinity of North Salt
Lake are supplied primarily by oil from Colorado and
Wyoming. Many smaller industries have been established here as a result of such pipelines. No one would
seriously contend that such pipelines have retarded wildcat drilling for oil in Utah or have been bad for the economy of Utah. Likewise, a pipeline carrying natural
gas into the Salt Lake area from the San Juan Basin of
New Mexico would improve our economy. Petitioner
in its desire to bring this supply to the Salt Lake area
should be received with open arms and not be confronted
by roadblocks of pure promotion.
Counsel for the Commission argues there would be
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lie Service Commission because nine months of the oneyear period will shortly expire and before the case can
be decided by the court the year will have expired. This
argument is no legal justification for affirming an unlawful order. When the one year draws to a close the
~tfcGuire Company will, undoubtedly, apply to the Public
Service Commission for an extension of time and this
could go on indefinitely while Utah Pipe Line stands by.
If the order was void in the first instance then the Commission would have no power to extend the one-year period and the Commission will be compelled to hear all
parties on the merits. If this court annuls the Cominission's order the effect will not be to permanently foreclose
the McGuire Company from presenting a new application. The effect will be a hearing of the application of
Utah Pipe Line and that of any other company (including
the McGuire Company) proposing to build a pipeline into
this area. The effect will be a hearing on what all the
parties "have to offer." That kind of hearing is what the
public interest requires and is the kind of hearing which
should have been granted many months ago.
Neither the c·ommission nor the McGuire Company
has adequately explained the lack of substantial evidence
to establish the basic prerequisites to the issuance of a
certificate of convenience and necessity, nor the complete
disregard of the Commission's statutory duty to safeguard the public interest, nor the consequent unlawful
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actions and orders growing from the arbitrary and unreasonable treatment of this petitioner by the Commission. The order of the Commission should be vacated
and annulled.
Respectfully submitted,

C. W. WILKINS
J. GLENN TURNER
Attorneys for Utah Pipe Line
Company, Petitioner.
Of Counsel
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
920 Continental National Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

TURNER, ATWOOD, WHITE, McLANE
&FRANCIS
Suite 1711
Mercantile Bank Building
Dallas 1, Texas
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